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Introduction
Soon after gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1964, Malta
began to seek to establish a formal link with the European Economic
Community (EEC). Since then it has used these relations as a vehicle for
adapting itself to the ever changing international context and as a tool for
facilitating the much needed process of change and modernisation of the
domestic economy. EU membership opens up a new phase whose
ramifications on Malta may be much broader and deeper, touching not only on
Malta’s economy and its international relations, but on other key domains such
as the environment, the legal system and the judiciary, Malta’s social structure
and political culture.
Malta’s relations with the EU can be approached from various angles but the
framework employed in this article relies on a small state approach. This mainly
involves framing the analysis within the broad policy aims that small states
pursue in their domestic realms as well as in their regional and global
environments. On many counts, these aims do not differ markedly from those
of other states: they comprise the state’s security, trade, economic
development, social stability and identity. However, due to their small size,
small states have different strengths and weaknesses when compared to
bigger states in confronting similar challenges.
When dealing with their “hard security threats” small states face a number of
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difficulties. While alliance may appear as the rational
answer to the small state’s security dilemma, it may
also lead to the small state’s subjugation to the
hegemony of the leading power within the alliance.
Similarly, neutrality might give a small state a sense of
security in peacetime but this holds true only in so far
as neutrality is respected by its neighbours. It is
difficult to answer categorically to the question of what
is the most advantageous policy for a small state,
whether it is neutrality or alliance? No course of action
seems to offer the small state water-tight guarantees.
In the economic field, small states lack a
sufficiently large domestic market to permit the
attainment of economies of scale in most economic
sectors. Two non-mutually exclusive approaches
can be taken: integration in the world economy using
the multilateral approach such as the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), or, integration within a regional
trading group. In the latter case, there are however
various stages of integration ranging from a free trade area and a customs
union to joining a common market or a monetary union. It is up to the state in
question to decide how it wants to relate to regionalism in its geographic area.
There being no universally accepted solutions nor one-way benefits, the small
state, as any other state has to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of
integration. Thus, while integration constrains a small state’s economic and
political freedom, this must be balanced against the ‘real’ freedom it enjoys in
the global economy and international system. One advantage that small states
derive from regional integration does not concern only their domestic domains
but also the management of their external economic and political environment.
It enables them to achieve a critical mass to better deal with the challenges of
globalisation and participate in global governance. In the words of Keohane
and Nye, “Regionalism can be seen as a response to globalisation.
Regionalisation may enable a group of states to reach a sufficient ‘critical
mass’ to make more effective its regulations towards global corporations and
other mobile entities. For instance, the European Union is much more able to
respond to unilateral United States policy as a group, than individual countries
of Europe would be able to do”1.
In a European context, the process of European union provides the small
states of Europe with a number of economic and political advantages. The EU
is a stabilising factor in the European continent and its periphery. A union
established to end Franco-German rivalry has locked the states of Europe in a
co-operative structure that has so far prevented war from breaking out.
Enlargement serves to extend this structure. The survival prospects of small
states have increased as a result. Often states are born as a result of war but
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European history has shown that the existence and separate identities of small
states have been most threatened or obliterated in periods of war and
imperialism. European unity has also provided the basis for economic wealth
to be increased. All European states have benefited from this but small states
appear to have been the most successful due perhaps to their greater flexibility
linked to their smallness. The Union is based on the principle of solidarity and
the transfer of economic aid to the poorer regions. The small, developing
states of Europe particularly Malta, Slovenia and the Baltic states can shorten
their economic ‘catching up’ time with the help of such aid, plus access to a
bigger market, as happened in the case of Ireland, provided they take
advantage of the opportunities presented by membership.
Increasingly the EU is consolidating itself as a factor of stability in its
peripheral regions, namely the Mediterranean, South-Eastern (the Balkans)
and Eastern Europe. Serious upheavals in these regions and sub-regions can
upset the economic well being of all European states but particularly that of the
weakest. In addition, in the case of small states such as Cyprus and Malta,
Slovenia and the Baltic states, upheavals on the EU’s periphery present not
only an indirect but also a direct threat to them. Hence these small states have
a bigger interest in strengthening the process of European union. In addition,
participation in the process gives them a bigger weight in determining policies
and events to their advantage than non-participation.
This article follows this pattern of analysis:
ñ A panoramic view of EU-Malta relations from around Malta’s independence
in 1964 to the present;
ñ The progress of and main results of the EU-Malta membership negotiations
and their impact on Malta and the EU;
ñ A discussion of possible future scenarios
A Historic Account2
In 1962, Malta formally asked for independence from the UK. From a Maltese
perspective this request was being made in quite a momentous international
context. In the previous year, on August 10th 1961, the United Kingdom had
applied to join the EEC. This application raised concerns about the UK’s future
relations with its actual and former colonies in the Commonwealth, which
enjoyed special economic and political relations with it, especially trading
preferences in the UK market. The main implication for Malta was that its
independence from the UK could only be realistically entertained in the context
of some formal link with the EEC if Britain joined. This would enable Malta to
maintain its special links with the UK until such time as it could achieve and
strengthen more varied links of interdependencies with other member states of
the EEC. The Maltese authorities soon found out that membership of the
Community was not possible in the short-term given Malta’s economic
backwardness. However, an association agreement was a distinct possibility.
On July 9th 1961, the Athens Association
Agreement had been signed between the EEC and
Greece, providing a model for potential and similar
agreements between the Community and non-
member countries of the Mediterranean region.
Indeed in the domestic debate on Malta’s future
relations with the EEC, references were made to the
Athens Agreement as a possible model for Malta.
However, for such an agreement to be concluded
with the EEC, Malta had first to achieve formal
independence from Britain. At the same time, and in
the prevailing political context existing then, the
Maltese political elite perceived EEC membership in
a broader sense, indeed as signifying more than just
maintaining the special links with Britain. Malta’s Prime Minister on arriving for a
conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers convened in London in
September 19623 expressed it quite succinctly: “We have expressed our wish
that Malta joins the European Community, though we still do not have a formal
application. We believe that eventually, Malta will join the Community, both in
the event of the UK’s membership and not. We too form part of Europe. Since
Malta is still not independent, it can only apply for an Association Agreement.
We are hoping to gain independence in a short while. In that way we will be able
to ask for full membership. [However] Malta will not make a formal application
before examining the problems which the UK will face in its own application”4.
At a later stage when EEC-UK membership negotiations were in full swing,
the European Commission proposed an interim and sui generis agreement,
which would apply in the event that the UK joined the Community before Malta
had become independent. France’s eventual blocking of the membership
negotiations with the UK rendered the latter proposal superfluous.
Malta achieved its independence in 1964 and its first priority became that of
consolidating its statehood, leaving relations with the EEC on the backburner
for the time being. At the same time Malta strove to improve its “European
credentials” by joining the Council of Europe in 1965, a step described by
Malta’s Prime Minister, as a “home coming after a period of absence”5. In the
meantime any hopes that were entertained at the time of developing stronger
economic relations with North Africa were dashed by the strong trade
protectionist policies followed by the states of the region. Relations with Italy
were high on the Maltese authorities’ wish list. But these could not be
adequately pursued until an association agreement had been concluded with
the EEC. In any case, in the first three years following Malta’s independence,
Italy showed no signs of over-enthusiasm for developing special links with
Malta, despite the long- standing historic ties between the two countries. This
can be explained by the fact that in the cold-war era, Rome tended to perceive
Malta as forming part of the UK’s sphere of influence.
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Relations with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) were not attractive to
the Maltese Government, who preferred relations with the EEC for what may be
described as ideological/political reasons. In any case, the UK’s application to
join the Community was a clear sign that EFTA’s longer-term prospects were
not bright. The apparent paradox that emerges from this discussion is that the
Nationalist Party which had struggled for Malta’s independence was the same
party which was actively seeking integrate Malta into the European Community
once independence had been achieved. This can be explained by the fact that
the Nationalist Party’s “nationalism” was a “soft” one defined largely by the
need to obtain self-government from the UK while maintaining Malta securely
within the Western European fold and possibly NATO. This vision also
comprised the strongest of possible relations with the UK. When discussing
the Nationalist Party’s attitudes towards European integration and Malta’s
place in that process it might be apt to recall that there is some evidence to
suggest that the leading intellectuals of the Nationalist Party, founded in 1880
to achieve independence from Britain, had from that time enthusiastically
espoused the 19th century ideal of a “United States of Europe”.
Malta returned to its EEC agenda in 1967, when it asked for negotiations with
the Community in order to conclude some form of trade agreement. This
renewed interest may have also been precipitated by the economic
consequences of the UK’s decision to scale down its military bases in Malta, a
decision which among other things implied laying off thousands of Maltese
employees of the British military services. Valletta perceived freer access into
the Community market as a means of strengthening the growth of the
manufacturing sector which together with tourism was expected to provide
alternative job opportunities. The Maltese initiative led to the conclusion of an
Association Agreement with the EEC6, which was signed in Valletta in 1970 and
which provided for the eventual attainment of a customs union with the
Community at the end of its second and final stage. No reference to eventual
Community membership was made in the agreement but both sides seemed
to regard it as a preparatory stage to membership. A Government white paper7
in preparation for the ratification of the agreement in the House of
Representatives (Parliament) roundly stated that although full membership
would, for the time being, be too great a burden on Malta, integration with
Europe was the ultimate objective8. A few weeks later, the Prime Minister, Dr
George Borg Olivier, in a speech on the occasion of the signing of the
agreement, referred to its objectives thus: “The agreement offers incentives
and encouragement which should be of considerable assistance to us in our
efforts to diversify our economy and to place it on surer foundations...The
political significance of our association with the Community lies, for our part,
mainly in the establishment of yet another strong link with the democracies of
Europe...We are also hopeful that in the course of time it could develop into
fuller participation in a united Europe”9. The President-in-Office of the
European Council, Mr Sigismund von Braun, replied: “The Community is
aware of the fact, that, in seeking association with it,
Malta has made a choice which goes beyond the
mere settlement of economic matters...The Maltese
Government has in fact decided on the close
participation of the country in the work of European
integration...This agreement is in fact a starting point,
not an achieved goal”10.
The Association Agreement was expanded further
by additional protocols in the mid-1970s in line with
Maltese requests to this effect and also because the
EC was strengthening its relations with the countries
of the Mediterranean littoral in line with its newly
launched Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) of
1972. A 1977 protocol extended the first stage of the
Association Agreement to the end of 1980. Few
serious difficulties were encountered with the EC
throughout the first stage of the agreement but this
stage expired with an impasse between the two
sides on the contents of the second stage. The EC
wished Malta to embark on the second stage leading
to a customs union while Malta demanded a ‘special relationship’ that would
not lead to this objective. As a result of this impasse, the legal basis of the
agreement expired, but its trade provisions continued to be renewed
unilaterally by the Community until agreement was eventually reached at the
end of 1980s to renew the first stage for an indefinite period. 
Since February 1979, just prior to the closure of the UK’s military bases in
Malta11, the Nationalist Party had been insisting stronger than before that for
political (particularly security considerations) and economic reasons it was
important for Malta to join the EU. The applications to join the Community
launched by Greece, Spain and Portugal provided an added incentive for
Malta to apply but the Labour Government shunned the opportunity. Following
a change of Government in Valletta in 1987, which saw the return of the
Nationalist Party (Christian Democrat) to power, relations with the Community
began to improve again. In 1990, Malta applied to join the European Union. Six
years later, as a result of another change in government in Valletta, the
application was suspended. Following yet another change in government in
1998, Malta changed direction again and reactivated its application. Accession
negotiations started in 2000 and were completed by the end of 2002. A
referendum on whether Malta should join the EU was organised on March 8th,
2003. Around 91% of eligible voters participated in this referendum of which,
53.6% voted in favour and slightly less than 46% voted against. In the run up to
the referendum, the Malta Labour Party (MLP) campaigned strongly against
membership and proposed as an alternative a Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership agreement with the EU. Since the MLP refused to recognise the
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result of the referendum and in order to remove the uncertainty created by this
stance, and its obvious negative economic repercussions, an early election
was called for April 12th 2003. The Nationalist Party was again returned to
govern for another period of five years and Malta signed the Athens Accession
Treaty on April 16th, 2003.
The Domestic Political Context
The degree of polarisation varies from one polity to another. However,
Maltese politics are highly contested and adversarial as shall be argued below,
and this is indicated by its high participation rates in general elections. Since
independence, politics have been dominated by the Nationalist Party-Labour
Party duopoly. The two parties have alternated in power as shown in the
appendix. The EU membership debate fell into the familiar mould of Maltese
politics. The governing Nationalist Party unequivocally supported EU
membership while the Opposition Malta Labour Party (MLP) which has
vacillated between a pragmatism that does not rule out membership altogether
to a more doctrinaire position that considers membership as detrimental to
Malta’s interests opposed it. Up to the election of April 2003 the MLP
campaigned for a ‘partnership’ with the EU based on a free trade area.
However, in the aftermath of the negative electoral result it obtained, many of
its key spokesmen declared that the “membership question” is no longer an
issue and that the Party has now to work within the confines of this new reality.
The highly contested nature of Maltese politics can be shown by the fact that in
the general elections of the last three decades the turnout (valid votes/eligible
voters) has never dropped below 90%12. Each major political party owns a
television and a radio station and both are deeply involved in the print media
and the internet. Their potential for mobilising the electorate is therefore
significant as the history of Maltese elections testifies. Attempts to extricate the
EU membership debate from the partisan political setting failed because of the
strong presence of the main political parties while the referendum result was
always expected to be close, either way, as indeed it was13.
The effects of this political fissure are mostly negative, but some of its positive
effects cannot be ignored. Beginning with the negative ones, the strong
adversarial politics have tended to unnecessarily dissipate national energies.
Small states by definition lack adequately trained human resources, if not in
per capita terms certainly in the raw quantitative terms required to execute
efficiently the tasks of statehood. At the same time the demands made on this
resource in a small country are in some cases similar to those placed on larger
ones. Thus while economic progress diverts qualified human resources away
from the public to the business and economic sector, the state has still to man
‘vital’ institutions that ‘make a state, a state’ such as the police, the army, the
judiciary, the national health service, the educational system, diplomatic
representation overseas, the line ministries, a Central Bank, an array of new
regulatory agencies that have been set up in
response to privatisation and liberalisation and
similar other organisations. The practice of ‘winner
takes all’ that has characterised successive changes
of government in Malta means that key positions in
government at various levels are awarded to Party
supporters. Thus at any one time a substantive
segment of the country’s limited and trained human
resource is left under-utilised, or at worse isolated
and ignored in public policy-making. Moreover,
political polarisation spearheaded by politically
biased media have tended to obscure issues by the
dissemination of exaggerated claims and counter-
claims, not least on the question of EU membership
leading to public uncertainty and undue pressures
on the democratic institutions, delays and often less than optimal decisions.
On the positive side the duopoly has led to stable governments normally
lasting the whole legislature. Furthermore, wafer-thin majorities, which
successive governments have had to content with over the past 32 years, have
made them vulnerable to shifting public moods. For this reason, in the context
of EU membership the Government has been obliged to take on board when
negotiating with the EU, a number of issues that in the popular images
encouraged by the opponents of EU membership, were perceived to be
threatening to Malta’s interests, immaterial of whether or not the threats were
real or imagined, likely or unlikely to materialise. Furthermore, the extreme
political polarisation has led to an intense public debate on the EU and its
institutions and a heightened public awareness of the main issues.
Popular images particularly those which are linked to Malta’s identity were
not only salient in the domestic political debate but they also exerted a strong
influence on the foreign policy-making process. A case in point were the
questions as to whether the Maltese language would eventually be admitted as
an official EU language and the safeguards against abortion. Another question
concerned the free movement of workers and the populist ‘image’ of the
dangers of an overwhelming influx of ‘foreign workers’ after Malta joins the EU.
Equally important were other issues such as the future of the ship repair and
shipbuilding sectors, agriculture and fisheries and the removal of protective
levies in trade with the EU. During the negotiations the Maltese negotiators
were pressurised in no small measure into including these demands in their
negotiating brief and in trying to negotiate an appropriate package that would
answer to these concerns. Two general stances were taken by the negotiators
to achieve their aims: they successfully used Malta’s small size to justify their
demands for ‘special treatment’ by the EU. They also argued most successfully
that the ‘major’ (from a Maltese perspective) concessions requested were in
reality ‘unimportant’ or insignificant for the Union. The results obtained by
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Malta demonstrate clearly that small states may not be completely helpless
when negotiating with a stronger party. 
Another important political development that has been triggered off by the
EU membership bid is that outside the Government-Opposition nexus, the
level of consultation between the Government and representative bodies of the
various sectors of society has increased. EU membership, which touches on
all aspects of national society is no longer perceived simply as a foreign policy
issue, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the lead. In an attempt to
achieve a modicum of consensus the Government set up the Malta-EU Action
and Steering Committee (MEUSAC) involving the so called constituted bodies
(such as the Malta Federation of Industries, the Chamber of Commerce and
the Employers’ Association), the trade unions as well as many other
organisations representing sectorial and economic interests, in all about 130
organisations representing the special interests of their members. MEUSAC
debated and approved the draft negotiating position papers before these were
transmitted to Cabinet for final approval. Major changes to these position
papers, which were required during the negotiations, were also referred to
MEUSAC for approval. Although it was placed under enormous time pressure,
mainly due to the time lost when the Maltese application had been suspended,
and although many of the participating organisations sometimes complained
about the time constraints placed upon in discussing certain points with their
members, MEUSAC managed to introduce an unprecedented element of
Government consultation hitherto not achieved in Malta’s political history. The
Labour Party was invited to sit on the Committee as a permanent ‘core’
member but refused. Although there is no legal or constitutional provision to
ensure MEUSAC’s permanence, the government has already pledged that it
would continue to convene it prior to and after Malta officially joins the EU on
May 1st 2004.
Another important development attributable to the EU membership
application is that Malta’s economic system has also been shaken in an
unprecedented manner. Compliance with the EU’s acquis communautaire has
put the environment at the top of the agenda in the public debate. But the quest
for EU membership has also instigated a number of changes in many other
sectors. Tackling the macro-economic fundamentals has become a priority in
view of the country’s bid to join European Monetary Union (EMU). The need to
remove customs tariffs led to the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) and a
wholesale reform of the antiquated tax system; privatisation, liberalisation and
the introduction of rules on fair competition and standardisation have led to the
establishment of semi-independent authorities to regulate various economic
sectors; protectionist barriers are rapidly being dismantled and the process will
be completed during 2003; agricultural reform including the adoption of phyto-
sanitarty standards has commenced; the independence of the Central Bank
has been strengthened and a hard look has been taken at the question of state
aid which mostly affects the shipyards and which are due to be ended by 2008
when the yards’ restructuring programme is
scheduled to be completed. In the social and labour
fields new rights for workers and especially health
and safety norms have been introduced. What is
noteworthy is that it is unlikely that most of the
structural changes that have taken place over the
past five years would have happened in the absence
of an EU membership application and the start of the
accession negotiations. In short, the EU
membership process has provided Malta with a
stimulus to modernisation on many fronts to a
degree not previously experienced in the country’s
history since independence. 
Security and Identity
As already stated, considered in the abstract the aims of small states in
international affairs are not much different than those of larger and stronger
states. Small states seek to safeguard their security, including the inviolability
of the national territory against traditional military incursions and against
‘softer’ ones such as those posed by organised crime or environmental
threats. Small states tend also to be jealous of their identities given their past
histories of foreign domination, even though they may not view EU
membership as constituting such a threat. Small states cannot rely on self help
to maintain their security and have to borrow the strengths of others to do so,
often opening themselves to the danger of falling under their hegemonic rule.
They are more dependent on external trade and thus have a keener interest in
maintaining their access to large markets, ultimately in safeguarding their
economic security. For analytical purposes it may be useful to examine the
economic and political aspects of security as two separate domains. But in
actual fact they are two parts of one whole.
The EU internal market provides small states with the right market access
opportunities and serves through its common commercial policy as their
gateway to world markets via the plethora of preferential trading arrangements
which the Union has with nearly all the countries of the world. It also gives the
individually weak small states a stronger negotiating potential in multilateral
economic forums such as the WTO. Since the EU is also actively trying to
stabilise the adjacent turbulent regions which surround it, and many small
states like Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and the Baltic countries are peripheral
states, the EU becomes an essential element of their security and survival. 
Looking back at Malta’s approach to its security challenges one can perceive
some very clear periods. In the immediate post-independence period, 1964-
71, the Maltese saw that the presence of UK military bases and NATO’s
southern flank headquarters were enough to deter serious military challenges
particularly those that could originate from the Soviet Mediterranean fleet and
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the lesser ones from neighbouring countries. From 1971 to 1987 a major policy
shift towards neutrality defined in terms of non-alignment and ‘third world
socialism’ occurs following the election to Government of the Labour Party led
by Dom Mintoff. However, this new stance altered very little in the underlying
Maltese perception about the nature of the threats faced. What really changed
was the prescribed method of tackling them. After 1971, relations with the EU
continued to be perceived as the key to Malta’s economic growth prospects
particularly following the eventual closure of the UK military bases in 1979. The
Association Agreement was to serve both as a means to prepare Malta for this
‘great appointment with its historic destiny’ and to sustain it afterwards14.
However, Malta’s formal assumption of a neutral status following the closure of
the UK military bases and its very ambivalent foreign policy following this, often
perceived at the time to be drifting towards the Communist Bloc countries
ostensibly with the excuse of ‘maintaining a stronger balance’ between East
and West, led to the Nationalist Party asserting EU membership with a stronger
intensity than before, as a means of safeguarding Malta’s democracy and its
market economy, ultimately its “Western” orientation15. Between 1971 and
1987 Malta’s “European identity” was perceived by some to be endangered by
this foreign policy tilt.
Following the 1987 election and the return of the Nationalist Party to
Government, Malta’s EU membership ambitions were re-activated, but not
without difficulties. Malta’s neutral status was perceived to be problematic on
the EU side, which was already aiming towards political union, and this despite
the fact that the Union already had a neutral member state, namely Ireland16.
Positively for Malta, this obstacle was overcome thanks to the unexpected and
dramatic changes that took place in Europe following the fall of communism
and the end of the cold war. These developments also led to reassessment of
the concept of neutrality itself and cleared the way for the entry of three more
neutral states in the EU namely Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. On the
basis of the Maastricht Treaty no serious obstacles seemed to be posed by
these states’ neutrality and the pursuit of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP).
In the 1990s, the nature of the security threats facing many European states
changed. The probability of military confrontation existed mostly in the Balkans
and perhaps in the unsettled border and ethnic questions in the former Soviet
states and Cyprus. Meanwhile in the Mediterranean region, the other area of
concern to Malta’s security, the situation appeared to be progressing towards
more stability despite the fact that the traditional crisis points were still active or
semi-dormant. A number of developments gave cause for optimism: the Oslo-
Madrid Middle East Peace Process (1991), the Five+Five Dialogue in the
Western Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Forum and most of all the
launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 all pointed to the fact
that things were improving even in this turbulent region. In 1994, NATO also
launched its Mediterranean Dialogue17. The chances of a direct north-south
military confrontation in the Mediterranean region,
absent since the Suez intervention of 1956 was
rendered much less probable by the developments
just summarised. From Malta’s “small state” angle,
the main challenge to the overall stability of the
region apart from the traditional ones that had
dogged it for many decades came from illegal
immigration, organised crime and illicit drug, arms
and human trafficking and the destabilising effects of
a collapse of the political order in one or more of the
key southern littoral states under the impact of the
Islamic Fundamentalist challenge. More items could
be added to this demoralising list following the
events of 11th September, mainly the threat of
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
A rational appraisal of Malta’s regional and
international context shows that its most efficient
policy response to it can be achieved through EU
membership. EU membership gives Malta the
possibility of participating in the decision-making
institutions of the EU from where the policies towards
the Mediterranean region originate. This not only
helps Malta gain more influence to shape
developments but it also increases its influence with
its southern Mediterranean neighbours, given that it
would be one of the countries to whom the Arab
World will attribute due importance by virtue of its
membership of the Union. As a former non-aligned
and still a neutral, small country, Malta is excellently
placed to play the role of honest broker in the north-
south politics of the region. By contrast, outside the
EU, Malta will be the smallest of 28 states with no
direct influence in any of the capitals of the Union let
alone in the southern Mediterranean countries. In
addition, the southern littoral states have recently shown signs of increased
unity considering the efforts to revive the Greater Arab Maghreb Union and the
Agadir Initiative that seeks to create an Arab free trade area18. These
developments in the economic and trade fields can lead to increased political
unity among the Arab countries, already loosely coalesced within the Arab
League. Somewhat paradoxically, while these positive developments help to
stabilise the Mediterranean region if pursued in the longer-term, they would
diminish Malta’s influence and role in the region had it decided not to join the
EU. 
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A discussion of Malta’s security must by necessity focus also on its neutrality.
Malta’s neutrality is defined in its Constitution, which states that “Malta is a
neutral state actively pursuing peace, security and social progress among all
nations by adhering to a policy of non-alignment and refusing to participate in
any military alliance”19. The Constitution also states that this status implies that
no foreign military base is allowed in Malta, that no military facilities are allowed
to be used by foreign forces except in the exercise of self-defence in the
eventuality that Malta is attacked or whenever there exists a threat to its
sovereignty, independence and neutrality; no military personnel are allowed
on Maltese territory except when performing civil works, although a
“reasonable number of military technical personnel” assisting in Malta’s
defence are permissible; the shipyards are to be used for commercial
purposes but military vessels put in a state of non-combat can also be
repaired, with the sole exception of those of the “two superpowers”. The
interpretation of the Constitution is that it allows Malta to adopt an activist
foreign policy and to participate in actions under the so called Petersberg
Tasks as defined in the EU treaties in so far that this does not entail breaking
the other conditions stipulated by the Constitution as outlined here. On the
other hand another interpretation of neutrality often aired in Malta, leans more
towards the traditional concept of no participation whatsoever in activities of a
military nature. That part of the constitution calling for the denial of the
shipyards to the military vessels of the two superpowers has been challenged
by allowing the yards to carry-out repairs on USA military vessels. The
argument employed by the Maltese authorities to justify this is that the
constitution is obsolete in this respect because it refers to a situation existing
during the cold war, which is no longer the case. The financial situation of the
shipyards meanwhile makes the refusal of such contracts difficult to acquiesce
to. Given these considerations, Malta’s EU accession negotiations on the
Common Foreign and Security Policy did not prove to be very problematic. 
Membership Negotiations 
What follows here is a short review of the most salient points of the
membership negotiations with the European Union. Beginning with the
question of neutrality, the issue was dealt with under the Chapter covering
External Relations and the CFSP. Negotiations were successfully concluded
without requiring Malta to change its neutral status. A declaration on Malta’s
neutrality was attached to the accession treaty. What helped in this case is that
participation in EU defence related matters remains voluntary, although there
should not be any points of divergence between Malta’s neutrality and EU
action under the Petersberg Tasks.
Two other important issues dealt with in the negotiations, namely the status
of the Maltese language and laws permitting abortion concern the Maltese
people’s cultural and religious identity. These two
issues evoked a lot of popular interest in Malta even
though they may be considered to be of lesser
importance by outsiders. The two issues were also
manipulated by the opponents of EU membership.
During the negotiations, the Maltese language was
accepted as an official EU language20. On the
second issue, abortion, there are no laws permitting
abortion in predominantly Roman Catholic Malta.
The main public concern was that once it joined the
EU, Malta would be forced to introduce laws
permitting abortion. A protocol was secured by the
Maltese negotiators, similar to a protocol secured by
Ireland and attached to the Maastricht Treaty stating
that nothing in the treaties “shall affect the
application in the territory of Malta of national
legislation relating to abortion.”
Another category of concessions secured by Malta
related to its small and limited territorial size. One of
them regarding the acquisition of residential property by non-Maltese citizens,
the other concerned the free movement of labour. Malta has been allowed to
retain on a permanent basis notwithstanding the EU treaties, the legislation in
place on the date of accession regarding the acquisition of secondary
residencies by foreigners. The Maltese negotiators successfully argued on the
basis of Malta’s restricted territorial size (316 square kms) and its high
population density, which at 1,911 persons per square km is the second
highest in the world, that it should be allowed to retain restrictions on the
purchase of property in Malta by foreigners, including EU citizens, on a non-
discriminatory basis.
Thus upon membership, EU citizens resident in any member state are
allowed to own a secondary home in Malta only after prior authorisation,
provided they satisfy certain conditions as currently applied by Malta
(threshold price of the property etc) and they are not entitled to own more than
one property. In order to own property freely, including property required in
connection with a business activity, EU citizens are required to have resided
permanently in Malta for a period of five years. These restrictions were needed
to prevent a burst of property speculation by foreigners, given that the building
area in Malta is so restricted which would lead to property price inflation and its
consequent social costs. As Commissioner Verheugen was quoted to have
said on December 12th, 2001, “it cannot be in the interest of the EU that an
ordinary Maltese family could find difficulty buying property in its own
country”21. This arrangement is being safeguarded by a protocol attached to
the Accession Treaty.
With respect to the free movement of persons, Maltese citizens shall enjoy
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complete free movement in the rest of the EU upon accession. But Malta has
secured a seven-year transitional arrangement in which it may apply
safeguards on the right of EU citizens to seek employment in Malta. After this
period, Malta can seek a remedy together with the EU. Again in this case the
arguments used by Malta were based on the restricted and small labour
market and that a hypothetical influx of a few hundreds of EU citizens could
lead to problems for Maltese citizens seeking employment.
In the economic sector, the most salient acquisition for Malta has been on
Value Added tax (VAT). Until January 1st 2010, food and medicines will not be
liable to VAT. But this arrangement is valid only if until that date no other EU
member state would still enjoy an exemption. International passenger
transport, inland transport and transport between the islands of Malta and
Gozo will be exempt from VAT as will new buildings and building land and
water supplied by public authorities.
On the island of Gozo, a Declaration by Malta is attached to the Treaty noting
the economic and social specificities and drawbacks of the island and
proposes measures to overcome them. 
In fisheries, Malta secured a 25 nautical mile conservation zone in order to
control fishing and help preserve the small Maltese fishing industry. Similarly
on Maltese agriculture the Maltese argued on the basis of the limited arable
land available, highly which is fragmented and parcelled into many small sized
holdings that make meaningful economies of scale impossible. Besides, the
sector suffers from many natural drawbacks such as shallow soil and lack of
water. Furthermore, the agricultural sector is important for the preservation of
what remains of Malta’s rural environment, with obvious positive ramifications
for the tourist industry. 
Malta’s approach in the negotiations was based on the notion that its small
size qualifies it for ‘special treatment’ in the application of key parts of the
acquis communautaire. In other words what many perceive to be a serious
handicap is being employed successfully to plead a ‘special case’. 
Conclusions
It was impossible to cover in this article to the required depth, the many
issues concerning Malta’s relations with the European Union, their effects on
Maltese society, politics and economy. What has been shown here are just the
most salient points of this relationship. Some general conclusions can
however be drawn. The most obvious one is that even in the pre-membership
scenario, the EU has proven to be useful in helping Malta achieve its main
ambitions post-independence: namely, it has helped her consolidate her
security, diversify its markets and achieve a sound measure of good
governance which has in turn strengthened Malta’s statehood and
independence. The run up to EU membership since 1990 has instigated deep
economic, political and social changes, unprecedented in its history. It is
hoped that membership will present the right
environment in which these trends can be further
consolidated.
Malta pays and will continue to pay some price for
these adjustments but the returns are also quite
significant. The issues that the Maltese people
perceive to be salient to their identity and values –
namely the Maltese language, neutrality and
religious fundamentals such as the stance against
abortion are not in any way jeopardised by EU
membership. The threat that Malta would be
negatively affected with a possible loss of identity as
a result of the free movement of persons and an
unrestricted property market has also been allayed.
Still on the positive side, Malta now forms an integral
part of a community of democratic states, which will underwrite its security and
strengthen it when facing its vulnerabilities. It does not stand alone when facing
the many soft security threats emanating from the Mediterranean region nor
when it confronts the more serious ones, such as terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through its participation in the
EU decision-making institutions it is more capable of influencing the
development of the EU’s external policies particularly those seeking to stabilise
the Mediterranean region, which is where Malta has to survive, grow and
prosper. None of these tasks could be performed by Malta standing alone. By
staying out of the EU, Malta would have become more insignificant, in Europe
and in the Mediterranean region.
Last but not least the effect of Maltese domestic politics on Malta’s foreign
policy process need also to be properly understood. Maltese society is
politically mobilised, and highly so. This has its advantages and disadvantages
as discussed above. However, below this upper layer of adversarial politics
and contestation lies an underlying pattern of recurrent behaviour, which often
leads to consensus albeit of a noisy kind. Following the March referendum and
the April 2003 General Election Maltese society and politics are finally settling
into the newly found consensus and equilibrium defined by support for EU
membership. Slightly more than half of the population is content that
membership was the rational way forward; slightly less than half thinks that this
is the reality that they must accept. Between both of them the absolute majority
of Maltese citizens agree that what matters from here onwards is EU
membership.
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Appendix
Malta National Elections, and Referenda - Turnout and
Majorities since Independence
Brief Explanatory Note
As can be seen from the first diagram, since 1966 Maltese politics have been
dominated by the Nationalist Party – Malta Labour Party ‘duopoly’ which have
alternated in power. Election results have always been close with just a few
thousand votes normally separating the two parties and a difference in
parliamentary seats ranging between 1-5. What is also interesting is the fact
that turnout is always quite high, the highest in the world in fact. This shows that
the Maltese electorate is a highly mobilised one. The high turnout and electoral
mobilisation can also be explained by the acute polarisation in the country.
The referendum for EU membership was called for March 8th 2003. About
91% of registered voters cast their votes of which 52.87% voted yes and
45.67% voted no. The MLP refused to acknowledge the validity of the
referendum claiming that the issue of EU membership must be decided by a
general election. A general election was called for April 12th and the Nationalist
Party gained an overall majority of 51.79% of the valid votes cast which
translated into 35 parliamentary seats to Labour’s 30. The Nationalist Party has
now a mandate to govern until the end of 2008.
REFERENDA  IN  MALTA
Registered Votes Votes Cast No yes invalid
Voters Cast as % of (% indicated as of votes cast)
Registered
Votes
1956 Integration with the UK 152,823 90,343 59.12 20,177 67,607 2,559
22.33% 74.83% 2.83%
1964 Independence Constitution 156,886 129,649 82.6 54,919 65,714 9,106
42.35% 50.68% 7.02%
2003 EU membership 297,881 270,650 90.85 123,628 143,094 3,928
45.67% 52.87% 1.45%
National Turnout
Election Nationalist Malta Valid Votes Nationalist Malta Others
Year Party Labour as % of Party Labour 
Party Registered Party
Voters
1966 47.9 43.1 89.71 28 22 nil
1971 48 50.8 92.4 27 28 nil
1976 48.43 51.54 94.3 31 34 nil
1981 50.92 49.07 95 31 34 nil
1987 50.91 48.87 95.48 35 34 nil
1992 51.78 47.69 95.3 34 31 nil
1996 47.8 50.72 95.02 34 35 nil
1998 51.81 46.97 94.01 35 30 nil
2003 51.79 47..51 95.95 35 30 nil
Party Votes
% of First Preference Votes cast
Number of Parliamentary Seats
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